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The Readymades of Marcel Duchamp:
Cut Flowers or les fleurs du mal?
Patrick Hutchings
... and the lion shall eat straw like the ox.
Isaiah 11:6
I
INTRODUCTION
The readymades of Marcel Duchamp are cut flowers. I
They are. furthermore, Kantian cut flowers, deracinated in a
teleological sense even while blooming in the garden. In the
famous passage in the The Critique of Judgement where he
sets out his seminal distinction between free and adherent
beauty. Kant writes:
Flowers are free beauties of nature. Hardly anyone but a
botanist knows the true nature of a flower, and even he, while
recognizing in the flower the reproductive organ of the plant.
pays no attention to this natural end when using his taste to
judge of its beauty. Hence no perfection of any kind - no
internal finality, as something to which the arrangement of the
manifold is related - underlies this judgement. Many birds (the
parrot. the humming-bird, the bird of paradise). and a number of
crustacea, are self-subsisting beauties which are not appurtenant
to any object defined with respect to its end, but please freely
and on their own account. So designs aLa grecque. foliage for
framework or on waH-papers. &c.• have no intrinsic meaning:
they represent nothing - no Object under a definite concept -
and are free beauties ...2
We take flowers as free beauties only by prescinding from
any botany that we may know, and considering them just as
occasions for the free play of the cognitive faculties. We go
not with the flow of immanent teleology, but with the
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'freedom' of the flowers sundered by us from their own
purpose, a purpose which they themselves do not know.
Three problems present themselves at once: (I) free of its
final cause, what sense does an object's formal cause, now,
make? How is it more, not less, worthy of regard? (2) How
can the now-aesthetic object be the intensional object of the
'free play of the cognitive faculties'? And (3) - which is
really prior to the other two - how does Kant's 'free play of
the cognitive faculties' play over aesthetic or aesthetized
objects anyhow? Kant gives too little by way of account of
'free play'. Taking away one of the aesthetic object's four
causes he gives the cognitive faculties their freedom by the
very cancelling of the final cause of the aesthetic object; but
what is the new freedom used for? On what is it exercised?
Kant writes elsewhere in the Critique of Judgement that
'without at all derogating from the teleological principle' we
may even see Nature herself, 'originating in free activity
aesthetically final forms'. 3
To be aesthetic is - for Kant - to be de-natured, cut off
from final causality. This cutting-off is itself only contest-
ably the 'object' of interest in the now aestheticized object:
we are left to specify further what is the 'object' of interest in
the de-natured object. Kant sometimes seems to suggest that
it is the freedom itself of the freed object which is the
'object' of free play of the cognitive faculties. But one is not
sure that he is right about this. And too many tricks seem to
be being played with the notion of 'free[dom)'. And, adrift
from an intensional object, the 'free play of the cognitive
faculties' looks oddly solipsistic.
De-naturing
Marcel Duchamp's snow shovel and his bottle rack shorn
of their utility in a cabinet of readymades are only a shade
removed from the rose in the vase or the rose-crystal among
the bric a brae, the one lost to botany the other lost to
geology, but as denatured, now the objects of taste.4 With the
pulchritude of Kant's flowers there is no problem - and that
is the problem. The beauty of flowers, and their being objects
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of taste, go without saying. The first readymade did not enjoy
the (as it were) a priori aesthetic privilege of a flower, even
though by having its immanent teleology suspended. it eo
ipso became aesthetic. What was pretty about a readymade?
Or, failing prettiness, what was interesting? The mere fact of
de-naturation hardly seems interesting, nor does it give us
much indication of what it would be that the - new - interest
could lie in. Flowers are too easy an example. Duchamp's
readymades were too enigmatic and so threatening, at least
initially, even to seem to be like flowers. In what did the
positive-after-the-de-naturing-negative consist?
Denaturing as the aesthetic squared?
Before we come to a consideration of the interesting in the
denatured aesthetic object, we must look at Kant's big logical
machine which grinds away final causes, leaving only formal
ones. Kant, in the distinction between pulchritudo adhaerens
and pulchritudo vaga, seems to be squaring aesthetic
distance. Ordinary aesthetic distance is defined by the observ-
er's suspending any desire to consume the object (in any
sense of 'consume') and being content merely to rest in
contemplation of it. This notion of aesthetic distance is
perhaps already in place in 5t Thomas Aquinas's remark
'Things are called beautiful which give delight on being
seen': id quod visum placet where the visum cuts off any
concupiscence with respect to the object in question.5 Kant
seems to want to go further: he comes close to cutting off not
just our interest in the aesthetic object's work-a-day purpose
or utility, but the object's own immanent teleology, as such.
It is almost as if Kant wanted to make the object as
disinterested as is the observer. The trouble with saying that
without qualification is that insentient objects, not being able
to be interested, can't be disinterested either. That allowed,
one will then repeat, 'It is almost as if Kant wanted to make
the, aesthetic, object as disinterested with respect to its own
teleology as is the, aesthetic, observer'. One characterizes
Duchamp's readymades as de-natured: a recent book on him
refers, apropos the readymade, to 'the anesthetized object'.6
This phrase at once evokes the fancy of objects' being aware
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of their own ends, and instantly stuns them into insensibility.
The phrase derives from Duchamp himself, which makes it
doubly telling. This denatured/anesthetized aesthetic is a
squared aesthetic: purest of the pure it would seem. As Duch-
amp put it - in another context - 'strictness of a Hugenot
sort' obtains here.7 Perhaps the squared aesthetic is too pure,
and something odd will come of it? We shall see, in due
course.
St Thomas Aquinas wrote, in the very id quod visum placet
passage:
The good and the beautiful are the same in substance, for they
are established on a single real form; but they are different in
meaning, for the good answers to appetite and acts like a final
cause, while the beautiful answers to knowledge and acts like a
formal cause. Things are called beautiful which give delight on
being seen.8
With its distinction between formal and final cause, this does
not by any means go as far as Kant does, though one might
defend Kant by saying that his account is very like Aquinas's
one. One might; but the celebrated distinction pulchritudo
adhaerens versus pulchritudo vaga seems to go beyond
Aquinas, in the direction of something which we have
characterized as the aesthetic squared. The trouble is that a
formal cause divorced from the final cause which it
'realizes', hangs free, and in a puzzling way. It is all right
when one is contemplating cut flowers, but it is not the cut-
ness of them that one finds engaging.
In Xenophon's Memorabilia of Socrates, Socrates gives an
account of the good-and-beautiful in terms of what
Aristotelians would later call: The nexus between final and
formal causes.9 For Socrates, as Xenophon reports him, the
question 'Is x good?' can be answered only by saying what x
is good for. Socrates is not interested in any x which is 'good
for nothing'. So much so that when Aristippus asks 'Can a
dung basket then be a beautiful thing?', the reply is: 'Yes by
Jupiter, and a golden shield may be an ugly thing if the one
is beautifully formed for its particular uses, and the other is ill
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formed'. Goodlbeauty for Socrates is not so much ad-herens
as in-herens. Shown a snow shovel, Socrates might not see its
beauty, not seeing what it is good for. But not attending to
the point of it would be for Kant the very condition of the
snow shovel's being taken as a free beauty. Taking away its
utility was to be for Duchamp an art-ing of the object. In one
place Duchamp asks 'Can one make works of art which are
not works of "art"?' 10 What he did with the readymades was
make works of art (whatever 'art' may tum out to mean) out
of useful artifacts: he 'arted' them by suspending their
usefulness. If they were sentient, they would feel as much en
vacance as are the cognitive faculties freely playing over
them (whatever that may tum out to be).
The present section of the paper may usefully (so, not
beautifully?) conclude, by way of summary, with the late
Professor W. K. Wimsatt's terse characterization of Kant on
beauty:
Kant's idea of beauty was severe; it related (so far as human
making was concerned) almost exclusively to the formal,
decorative, and abstract: to Greek designs, foliation on
wallpaper, arabesques (things which 'mean nothing in
themselves'), music without words. The 'charms' of direct
sensuous pleasure might fuse with beauty, and beauty might be
combined with perfect natural forms and purposive human
artifacts (the good, the ideal), but in neither of these cases was
beauty pure. Beauty allied to the good was not 'free beauty'
(pulchritudo vaga) but dependent beauty (pulchritudo adhaerens).
The two might help us by being together, but strictly speaking
neither helped the other. It is worth noting that here was a
system which conceived Homer and Shakespeare as less
aesthetically pure than wallpaper. I I
Like most of us, Wimsatt would rather read Hamlet than
watch the wallpaper.
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II
DUCHAMP'S READYMADES: HOW DOES HE MAKE
THEM AND WHAT DOES HE MAKE OF THEM?
How Duchamp does what he does presents no problem:
but problems arise when how he does it is taken to provide an
account-without-remainder for what it is that he does.
How?
Duchamp makes his first readymade (whichever one was
first) by performative utterance. 'Let this be "art"!' 12 And
he was able to do this because he was, after the scandalous
success of Nude Descending a Staircase, 2, at the New York
Armory Show, 1913, a Magus. 13 Duchamp - though Nude 2
is no mean painting - was not a great painter. He is not to be
compared with Cezanne, Picasso, Matisse. He himself knew
that to become a major figure he would need to be a non-
retinal artist. 14 And he seems to have thought that retinal art
was, anyhow, over. Retinal art was not over. Nevertheless, as
Duchamp said - apropos a work less revolutionary than any
readymade - 'Without knowing it, I had opened a window to
something else' .15 What this something else was must occupy
our attention for a while.
What?
Once one readymade has been aesthetically made-ready
and (in some sense of 'art') made art, one has a one-off
sensation. On the first occasion this theatrical sensation is
interesting in itself. The initial buzz may even be kept up,
may be kept coming, by a Magus such as Duchamp.
Duchamp's life is his real work of art, with works -
readymades made-ready from time to time - being both a
function of and a feeding-up of his celebrity. All that Warhol
was later to do with celebrity, Duchamp with his enigmatic
presence, his notable absences, and his feigned retirement
from art, had already done. Everywhere in contemporary art
Duchamp is there first. Even the chess - an absence from
'work' - is a model for the oeuvre. The self-containment and
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self-sufficiency of chess are very much to the Duchampian
point.
But, after Duchamp, where can the interest of ready-mades
lie? What he did first no one else can now do first. Where
may the positive interest of the (negatively) de-natured
objects lie? Five suggestions - which do not exhaust the field:
(a) The whole world of aesthetic objects is the point of these
objects?
Jerrold Seigel in his book The Private Worlds of Marcel
Duchamp draws attention to Duchamp's desire 'to remake
language' .16 Like Mallarme and Laforgue, Duchamp susp-
ected that we are already locked into a natural/social language
- one that is almost but not quite unable to comm-unicate
our authentic experiences. Duchamp's construction of, as it
were, a Free Play Ground of aesthetic objects - a structuralist
enclave of internal relations and internal cross-references
(rather like chess) before the structuralists came along to map
it - is motivated by the anxiety about language which was
around in early modernism. The notion of a Free Play
Ground catches, too, the spirit of Duchamp's own: 'It is
always the idea of "amusement" which causes me to do
things' .17
Saul Bellow reads James Joyce's notion of epiphany as 'a
manifestation that summarizes or expresses a whole universe
of meanings' .18 and one might treat anyone Duchamp
object as 'epiphanizing' in this sense, and say of it that 'it
consummates the all-pervading theme of hermetic anarchy'.
De-natured object x stands for all-and-any-thing, perhaps, in
that closed universe of discourse which de-natured objects
establish for themselves. In his Dialogues with Marcel Duch-
amp Pierre Cabanne records this exchange:
Cabanne: Chess is the ideal work of art?
Duchamp: That could be. 19
It both was, and was not, for Duchamp.
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(b) The readymade as Kantian pulchritudo vaga?
Fountain is perhaps the most notorious readymade, and its
complicated (willfully mystified?) history is part of its fame:
in effect, part of il. A urinal facetiously signed 'R Mutt,
1917' was sent in to, and rejected by, the New York Indep-
endents show of 1917; was photographed by Alfred Stieglitz;
was subsequently lost; and notably was bought/not-bought by
Walter Arensberg (it is not in the Arensberg Collection in
Philadelphia). It has been - if imperfectly - replicated and
now rests, virtual if not literal, in the Arturo Schwarz collect-
ion in Milan.2o
The de-natured urinal, left unplumbed, turned so that its
vertical is now its horizontal axis, performatively - if
abortively - uttered as 'art!', becomes ... what? In Calvin
Tomkins's book Duchamp: a Biography there is an account
of the rejection of Founlain which contains two interesting -
but quite different - observations by Arensberg.21 The first
observation is absolutely Kantian, the second - putatively -
Duchampian. Putatively, but we shall see.
Firstly, defending Fountain against George Bellows,
Arensberg said, 'A lovely form has been revealed, freed from
its functional purpose, therefore a man [Mutt/ Duchamp] has
clearly made an aesthetic contribution' .22 Well, function de-
natured, an aesthetic object has been made: this by definition
in the Kant-Duchamp system. The material question remains:
has a lovely form indeed been revealed? Unfortunately, the
urinal is not as engaging as a flower; it is about as amusing as
wallpaper. To call it 'the Bhudda in the bathroom' as Louise
Norton did cuts very little aesthetic ice, though Tomkins
seems to think it does. 23 The interest of the work lies
elsewhere. Where this elsewhere is we shall suggest at the end
of this paper. Duchamp would not have agreed with his
patron's defence of Fountain as the revelation of a hidden or
overlooked beauty. He himself said: 'You have to approach
something' - some candidate for Ready-Madehood - 'with
an indifference, as if you had no aesthetic emotion. The
choice of a readymade is always based on visual indiffer-
ence' .24
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Secondly, Arensberg's putatively Duchampian (as oppos-
ed to his Kantian) move is in another remark to Bellows:
'This is what the whole [Independents] exhibit is about; an
opportunity to allow the artist to send in anything he chooses,
for the artist to decide what is art. not someone else' .25
Whatever WaIter Arensberg meant to mean here, it remains
the case that art, art by decision, art by performative
utterance, has to contain an interest for the free-playing-
cognitive facuIties over and above the striking decision/
utterance itself. One felt this quite strongly at the recent
Melbourne Biennale Signs of Life, 1999. Many works were
striking as the works they were. Others - and one spares
feelings and controversy by not giving examples - were
Duchamp-yet-again. Duchamp encore does not entail an
encore.
Duchampian - or any other - de-naturing does not inex-
orably produce a beauty out of a utility: nor any other thing
of interest, above and beyond beauty. As One might expect,
Duchamp would be no more pleased by Arensberg's second
line than with the first. In the Duchamp-Cabanne Dialogues
we find:
Cabanne: How did you come to choose a mass-produced object,
a 'ready-made' to make a work of art?
Duchamp: Please note that I didn't want to make a work of art
out of it26
The question then remains: if not art, what?
Duchamp sets a puzzle: he, as indifferent ('the readymade
was just a distraction. I didn't have any special reason to do
it'27), takes an indifferent object, and of a ready-made-
artisan-object makes a meta-artisan-object. He does this by
his power as a Magus.
But what is it that the already-artisan-made-object is now
made into? We might insist, despite Duchamp, that what the
already-made-made-Ready-Made is, is art (note, we need here
honorific capitals). It is 'art' at least in the sense that Ready-
Mades (and their more recent clones) exist as objects in the
art-world, rather than in the hardware-world or the bygones-
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world. As Magus, Duchamp - to borrow a word from him -
'consecrates' an artificer-made-ready-made and so makes it
a Ready-Made. 28 What is it now 'Ready' for? What is the
upshot of the 'consecration'? Duchamp said to Cabanne, a
propos Bottle Rack and Snow-Shovel: 'The word "ready-
made" thrust itself on me. It seemed perfect for these things
which were not works of art ... and to which no art terms
applied. This is why I was tempted to make them' .29 Quite so,
but make them what? The first making already done by
artificers, all that Duchamp could - subsequently - make was:
a difference? What began in (double) indifference ends with a
difference. We must try to see what this difference is.
(c) De-naturing making-ready readymades as de-and-re-
naluring. de-and-re-conrexlualising. de-and-re-perspectiv-
alizing.
The window which Duchamp opened is one of newly-
putting-into-perspective, newly-contextualizing, and even of
re-naturing-the-de-natured. These are the new rules/misrules
which he gave to art. Arensberg thought in effect that the
urinal could carry off its aesthetic status as easily as a flower
could. It cannot. And it would be to miss the positive side of
Duchamp to restrict him to the Kantian free beauty move, for
all that it is - in a way - his basic one, at least when he is in
his ready made mode. Postmodern and some Modern
aesthetic lies outside and beyond 'beauties', and within 'new
looks', 'new looks at', the ironizing of old looks, and
ironizing old looks-at, and so on. This hardly needs to be
instanced or argued at the turn of the twenty first century.
But I shall take the oddest of the three cases in my heading:
re-naturing-the-de-natured. In de-naturing the snow shovel
and making the (feeble) joke about it, 'In advance of the
broken arm' - that is, snow shovelling will prove ineffective,
useless/aesthetic - Duchamp has found a new use for the
shovel. It is good for a joke. Socrates laughs.
(d) Get a cause!
Re-naturing denatured snow shovels, bottle-drying-racks,
and urinals as jokes or bare spectacles moves them into
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another final-causation. They become, not themsel ves, but
themselves-as-something-else. Metaphors. They stay in one
place, but still move over. And get a new meaning/ point, with
this moving-over-on-the-spot.
The vast exhibition in Verona in 1997, DadaismolDada-
ismi da Duchamp a Warhol, 300 capolavori displaced many
objects and re-situated them. 30 They 'got a cause', often a
political rather than Uust) a final cause. The denatured thing
may be politicized, and this may (and equally may not)
illustrate that, un-de-natured, the thing was already full of the
political. This discourse and the rhetoric of it are by now
well-known. They owe a lot to Duchamp, and I kept looking
around for him in Verona. What Duchamp did was: open
windows on de/recontextualizing, re-arranging the view, and
so on. He had some success, but success for his successors is a
possibility only.
(e) If de-naturing makes x an object of taste, do different de-
naturings taste different?
This question was sparked for me by seeing Joan Brossa's
work in the Spanish Pavilion of the Venice Biennale 1997.31
Much of it was Duchampian: but it had a different tingle on
the tongue. A piece called Nupcial, half a handcuff joined to
a necklace to make the full set, might have amused Duchamp.
But Brossa has his own flavour. Conte - a typewriter typing
incoherently on a clutch of multi-colour paper streamers -
and Poema objecte - a large white envelope, unmarked
except for 'A' and the heart of the Ace of Hearts in its top
left corner - remind one that de-natureds can contingently be
poems, as they are (by definition) aesthetic objects. And no
two poems read the same. And not all tastes taste the same:
Duchamp, tart French apple flavour; Brossa, Spanish oranges.
This set of considerations (a) to (e) fills in only some
possibilities of positive aesthetic interest which may supervene
on the de-naturing of artifacts. Mere routine Duchamperie
often stops at de-naturing, and does not realize its obligation:
10 go on from there . ..
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III
DENATURING AND PERVERSITY: IS KANTIAN PURITY
TOO PURE FOR ITS OWN GOOD? OR, HOW HARD CAN
'HUGENOT STRICTNESS' FALL?
The 'old' aesthetic was a function of our giving up
ordinary desire for x in favour of contemplation of it. The
Kantian squared aesthetic seems to turn on the aesthetic
object's giving up its own immanent teleology - at least the
'purest' case, pulchritudo vaga, requires this. But is so pure
too pure? 'The corruption of the best produces the worst', as
St Augustine ominously says.
The new-poi nt-giving joke about Fountain is that a recept-
acle for body waste becomes - conceptually, if not as to
plumbing - a source. This is, perhaps, only a schoolboy joke.
But, curiously, it is the quite innocent-seeming Trebuchet
which moves from de-naturing to the perversion of a nature.
In all writings about Duchamp one comes up against
references to onanism, and the very metaphor of metaphors
behind the Chocolate Grinder, itself the object at the very
centre of The Large Glass, is Trebuchetl Trap.32 Trebuchet
looks reassuringly banal. It is a ready-made coat-hat-scarf
hanger of four three-pronged metal hooks fixed to a wooden
board, the whole arrange-ment being intended to be mounted
on the wall, for the hanging up of coats, and so on. Duchamp
screwed one to the floor of his room, so it became a
Trebuchet, a Tripper-Upper. It is not just a move in chess (as
a trebuchet is) but a lowdown up-holder bringing down a
householder. 'Arrange the Fall in your own flat': you too
can be Adam and Eve, as in an early perform-ance piece.33
That is, we have here a use of the coat-hanger not just
apart from its teleology, but against the coat-hanger's
nature.34 A 'superfluity of naughtinesses' in metaphor, if not
in fact. 35 Duchamp was raised a Catholic and he would have
been taught that the sin of Onan, who spilled his seed on the
ground so as to avoid giving children to his brother's widow,
was not just a sin against the Chosen People and its increase,
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but a sin because of the perversion/'perversion' of the sexual
act itself.
It is difficult, with Onan in mind, not to read together
Trebuchet and a key entry in The Green Box and add the two
together for a meaning-total. The entry explains the main
fonn in The Bride stripped Bare by her Bachelors Even - that
is, the Chocolate Grinder. The entry runs: 'Adage / [(Princ-
iple]] of [Spontaneity] (which explains the gyratory ml of the
grinder without other help) The bachelor grinds his chocolate
himself' .36 Libido moves everything, as Freud had lately
observed; so, 'the gyratory movement'. But the issue of the
movement is not, as the plurality of bachelors might suggest,
orgiastic but fairly clearly Onanistic. 'He grinds his chocolate
himself. The dirty jokes which lie only half concealed at the
heart of so many of Duchamp' s works tum on the trope of
Trebuchet. The de-natured is often more than negatively
denatured, rather it is willfully perverted! 'perverted'. Kant's
aesthetic squared, by cutting off consid-erations of immanent
teleology, seems to have opened a crack through which actual
perversion of teleology has come in. A paradox for Kantian
aesthetics - and one he could hardly have foreseen. Is
Duchamp the serpent in Kant's Garden of Innocence?
IV
CONCLUSIONS
Etant donnes/Being given
Duchamp's posthumous masterpiece Etant donnes ends
the celebrity-oeuvre with a nude, as Nude Descending had
begun it with one.37 Only the last nude, almost as confront-
ational as Courbet's The Origin of the World, deliberately
does not name itself: Being given, J. the waterfall. 2. the
illuminating gas, is the (deadpan) full title. And waterfalls
and gas are well known parts of the Duchampian Great Free
Play Ground's only half-innocent furniture. What is
unnamed in the title of Etant donnes the viewer has a window
opened on to: two eyeholes in a stout door through which
only one person at a time may look. Only one view may be
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taken. Licence - The Origin of the World - and constraint,
the straitened view, meet here. One is being compelled to Du-
champ's pseudo-gynrecological point of view: one bridles.
And of course the atmosphere of the whole installation is ...
curious. It feels like the summation of a complex and sustain-
ed sexual obsession, which it expresses - though it seems not
to resolve it. Etant donnes may call into question aesthetic
distance - Even - and the whole aesthetic-of-distance. But,
equally, it makes one feel that one could do with quite a lot
of distance here.
Whether Etant donnes is intended as a Duchampian
'Ironism of affirmation' one is not sure. Duchamp writes in
The Green Box, enigmatically, 'Irony of affirmation:
differences from negative ironism dependent solely on
Laughter.'38 One does not laugh at Etant donnes, one does
not find it in any usual sense beautiful. It's kitsch. One feels
obscurely embarrassed. Perhaps this is because the laugh is
on one.
On the other hand, perhaps not. After visiting Etant
donnes one sees the thrust of Duchamp's own note in The
Box of 1914 on Fountain: 'One only has: for female the
public urinal and one lives by it' .39 I find that very nasty.
Tomkins finds this text the real point of Fountain. A
smoking room rather than a schoolboy joke then.
But there is more.
Paysage fautiflFaulty Landscape
More to the point of the logic of the trope of de-naturing
and perverting than The Bride, even, or Trebuchet, is Paysage
fautif. This blobby work which Duchamp sent in a Portable
Museum to his sometime mistress Maria Martins is illustrated,
full page, in colour, in Bonk's book-edition of the valise.
Under media one reads: 'Seminal fluid on Astralon backed
with black satin, 12 x 17 em: signed MD 1946'. There is, as
well, the note: 'Research to establish the nature of the essence
used to make Paysage fautif was carried out by the FBI
Laboratory in Houston, Texas' .40 The ironically-coy grinder
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and trebuchet metaphors become, under FBI scrutiny, limp
fact.
• • •
My colleague Dr Tom Gibbons has sent me a paper by
Professor John F Moffit in Studies in Hermeticism
demonstrating that Etant donnes is an alchemical work.41
And well it may be. But into all that, with its mystical
marriages and so forth, I am not competent to go. This
present paper must rest on two, mere logical, points which
have been raised, if not perhaps rendered totally perpicuous.
The first point is that the readymade is the example, pa r
excellence, of Kant's de-natured free beauty; and while its
freedom is obvious, its 'beauty' remains problematic. Not
that the problems are insoluble, but they are tricky. That the
beauty of flowers is no problem only sharpens the problem
of those 'beauties' which do not go without saying. The
second point is that the suspension of teleology may lead,
curiously, into the perversion/'perversion' of it. This second
point is uttered as a contribution to the logical grammar of
Duchamp's jokes. Trebuchet is an object lesson, here. So
bland, so deeply naughty.
Of course if, as our epigraph reads, 'the lion shall eat straw
like the ox', then de-and-re-naturing may not be odd and
suspect at all, but millennial and truly Utopian.
A dying fall
Where Kant would stand on pulchritudo vaga, after
Duchamp, is problematic. By turning the aesthetic-squared of
pulchritudo vaga, Duchamp subverts the old fashioned
aesthetic distance of, for example, id quod visum, and makes
the aesthetic object positively sexy. This solves, at a stroke,
the problem of the intensionality of the free aesthetic object
in respect of the free play of the faculties. Sex is always
about; sex is always interesting; sex-objects are always
interesting; sex has a way of overcoming indiffer-ence. Sex
will, always, do it 'without other help', as The Green Box puts
it. Indeed, that 'sex is always interesting', like 'flowers are
beautiful', goes without saying.
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But sex, as Duchamp writes of his Bride, is 'ignorant
desire, blank desire'. And this all-embracing desire - now the
intension of all so-called aesthetic intentions - is expressed
by Duchamp 'with a touch of malice' .42 Well might it be
maliciously put. Firstly, turn on pulchritudo vaga has, in
effect, subverted the old aesthetic distance and, secondly, the
new 'aesthetic' needs no intensional objects of the traditional
sort. 'Blank desire' could not tell one of them from another.
'Blank desire' is polymorphous - indeed it is polymorph-
ously perverse.
Such an aesthetic - one of blank desire - would be itself
pointless. Would it be pointless-and-pretty like a-f1ower-to-
be-admired? Or just pointless? It would be pointless insofar
as no aesthetic case would differ from any other aesthetic
case, nor would the aesthetic differ from that free-floating
libido from which cultures have generally sought to extricate
it. The perverse and pointless is not, by that mere token,
admirable. Duchamp falls over his own Tripper-Upper, which
proves to be as banal on the floor as on the wall.
To put it shortly: Kant's wallpaper is replaced by a whole
inventory of fetishes. 43 Art becomes, to cite Duchamp
himself, 'a little like masturbation. '44 And if Kant's 'free
play of the cognitive faculties' looked, as we said at the
beginning, oddly solipsistic, Duchamp's turn on such a
solipsism is (to use again the old booksellers' term)
decidedly 'curious'.
In the context of all this, one recalls Duchamp's remark
that his art practice 'is really a way to bring out into the
daylight things that are constantly hidden ... because of social
rules' .45 Of these things-revealed Duchamp says, ignoring
Arensberg's suggestion that they are hidden or overlooked
beauties, 'Eroticism was a theme. even an "ism" which was at
the basis' of much of his work.46 Eroticism was then the basis
of the obscure Ready-Mades made of the already-made
objects of everyday life. Perhaps we should read Ready-
Mades as like dream-symbols, or as something between
fetishes and dream-symbols - those nocturnal things which
reveal. always by metaphor, desires which even when we are
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asleep the Censor censors, and which, when awake, we may
admit, if still only indirectly, in the always-already-
ambiguous space of the art-gallery.
The odd thing is that the logic of all this begins in an
extreme of Kantian purity, and in the (unconscious) sexuality
of flowers, and in our willed unconsciousness of it.
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